The Africa We Want: Silencing the Guns



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The Africa We Want: Silencing the Guns by 2020

Introduction

This paper examines how arms control and disarmament efforts can contribute to solving the multifaceted challenges of the African Union (AU) project called "Silencing the Guns". This project was initiated in 2013 on the 50th anniversary of the AU with the aim of ending all wars in Africa by 2020.[1] The project forms a part of the AU's broader development plan envisaged to positively transform the lives of Africans by the time of the organization's hundredth anniversary.

It is argued that coordinated measures to stop the proliferation and misuse of arms must not just aim at removing guns from the streets of Africa and from criminal gangs and traffickers, but must also involve the effective implementation of internationally agreed best practices by State authorities, agencies and security forces, as well as involve the strengthening of national laws in line with relevant treaty obligations of African States relating to the transfer of weapons, munitions and related equipment. It is hoped this paper will assist African governments to identify critical measures, including ones that will result in quick wins, and other measures that will form a solid framework to bring arms under better control, such as ratifying and implementing existing international and regional instruments.

Methodology

The research for this paper focused on five countries: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. These countries are all in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region.[2] SADC is a Regional Economic Community comprised of 16 Member States: Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Established in 1992, SADC is committed to regional integration and poverty eradication within Southern Africa through economic development and by ensuring peace and security. The paper examines what has been done so far in these countries and, in particular, what measures could generate quick wins to help silence the guns in the SADC and other African countries.

The methodology consisted of a desk review of relevant documentation, including but not limited to the African Union's Lusaka Master Roadmap on disarmament agreed in 2016 (as referenced below), national implementation plans, reports to and by the AU and its Member States, public statements by the AU and its Member States, register of events organized in relation to the roadmap, and related publications such as those by the AU, UN, European Union, and civil society.

[1] African Union Agenda 2063

[2] www.sadc.int

Furthermore, information was gathered through discussions with key stakeholders of the AU and its Member States, as well as with relevant civil society actors. A set questions was developed and sent to participating countries to respond.

This work addresses measures related to conflict and non-conflict settings and its geographical focus is on progress made by the five selected SADC countries toward the African Union's Master Roadmap. The research did not deal with all the issues raised in the Lusaka Master Roadmap but attention was given to the following five key areas:

Political Aspects
Challenge 3a) Illicit flows of arms/weapons into Africa.[3]
Challenge 3b) Illicit proliferation and circulation of arms/weapons inside Africa.[4]

Economic aspects
Challenge 14) Persistence of illicit financial flows, including those directed to illegal arms transactions, financing of terrorism and external political interference.[5]

Social and Gender Aspects
Challenge 16) Irregular migration, human, drugs and arms trafficking, drug abuse, as well as sexual abuse and violence against women and children.

Legal Aspects
In order to understand how these aspects can be addressed with best practices, particular attention has been given to identifying existing international and regional benchmarks to frame national action plans.

Note that for many reasons, not least lack of capacity, reliable data related to illicit arms trafficking and gun violence in Africa and many other countries is difficult to verify, a point repeatedly made by UN bodies such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Thus, the data presented in this paper should be treated as provisionally indicative, rather than as definite.

Background

In May of 2013, Africa celebrated the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now called the African Union. On that occasion, Africa's political leadership assessed past achievements and challenges to identify ways to drive the continent forward to achieve wide-ranging goals similar in scope and

[3] African Union, *Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020: Lusaka Master Road Map* (2016), https://au.int/en/documents/20200204/african-union-master-roadmap-practical-steps-silence-guns-africa-year-2020-lusaka.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.

ambition to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As part of the milestone celebration, the AU Assembly released a "Solemn Declaration," also known as the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration (50th ASD), which called on Member States to promote continental socio-economic and political transformation for a prosperous and peaceful Africa.[6] The AU Summit directed the African Union Commission to prepare a continental 50-year agenda through a people-driven process. The Commission received support from the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The 24th AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted "Agenda 2063" in January 2015.

The AU identified 20 goals within the vision of Agenda 2063 that are based on seven African aspirations. These goals take cognizance of the goals and priority areas contained in the Common Africa Position (CAP) and the Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2015. The strategies employed reflect those contained in plans of Member States, regional plans, continental frameworks, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa / AU Economic Reports 65 on Africa. The 2014 Africa Transformation Report and Africa Vision 2050 are also considered.

The African Union's Agenda 2063 outlines a 50-year vision for sustainable development of the continent. The Agenda recognizes the people of Africa as the key actors and drivers of this vision, and also recognizes that Africa's citizens are a dynamic force for good in the international arena. Agenda 2063 is a shared strategic vision for inclusive growth and sustainable development. It was developed through a people-driven and comprehensive consultative process. Below are the Seven Aspirations, which each has its own set of goals:

The Seven Aspirations[7]

- **Aspiration 1**: A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development.
- **Aspiration 2**: An integrated continent; politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance.
- **Aspiration 3**: An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice, and the rule of law.
- **Aspiration 4**: A peaceful and secure Africa.
- **Aspiration 5**: An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values, and ethics.
- **Aspiration 6**: An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for

[6] African Union Commission, *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want* (Addis Abbaba, African Union Commission, 2015), https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36204-doc-agenda2063_popular_version_en.pdf.
[7] Ibid.

children.

- **Aspiration 7**: Africa as a strong, united, resilient, and influential global player and partner.

Elaborating Aspiration 4: A peaceful and secure Africa

Under this aspiration, Africa is envisaged to emerge as a conflict-free continent with harmony among communities at the grassroots level. Inter-state and intra-state wars are expected to be eliminated. Mechanisms are to be put in place to prevent and/or resolve conflicts. Diversity among ethnic, religious, economic, and cultural groups, etc. would be a source of wealth and accelerate economic growth rather than be considered as a source of conflict. The 4th Aspiration highlights the need for conflict resolution and management in all its aspects. It particularly notes that major threats to peace, security and development include armed conflict, terrorism, gender-based violence, and extremism. It also aims to instill a culture of peace and tolerance throughout the continent.

The importance of ensuring peace, security, and stability of the continent was recognized by the OAU from the very beginning of its existence. It established the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration as well as the Defense Commission and later the Central Organ and its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. Thus, peace and security have been at the heart of concerns of Africa's leadership from the very start.

In September 2015, the African Union Commission (AUC) was tasked with devising the "First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014-2013." The purpose of developing the plan was to:

1. Identify priority areas, set specific targets, and define strategies and policy measures required to implement the first ten years on the journey to 2063.
2. Bring to fruition the Fast Track programs and initiatives outlined in the Malabo Decisions of the AU to provide a big push and breakthroughs for Africa's economic and social transformation.
3. Provide information to all key stakeholders at the national, regional, and continental levels, members of the African diaspora, development partners, and global financial institutions about the expected outcomes of the First Ten Year Implementation Plan as well as the roles expected of them
4. Assign responsibilities to all stakeholders in the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the plan.
5. Outline the strategies required to ensure the availability of resources and capacities together with citizen engagement to implement the First Ten Year Plan.

Silencing the Guns

Part of Agenda 2063 aims to end all wars and manage and prevent civil conflicts and gender-based violence effectively in the continent. It also seeks to prevent violent

conflicts and genocide as part of Africa's collective efforts under the slogan "Silence the guns in the continent by the year 2020".

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU was inspired and guided by the clarion call made during the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration (ASD). Convinced that conditions for silencing the guns existed in the continent, they committed to achieving the goal of a conflict-free Africa. African leaders pledged to make peace a reality, end human rights violations, and effectively manage and prevent humanitarian disasters, including genocide. The pledge was initially coined under the slogan "Silence the guns by 2020". The longer vision embedded in the idea is the need to prevent the burden of armed conflicts and armed violence from falling onto the next generations of Africans.

However, in September 2015[8] when devising the "First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014-2013," the AUC modified the timeline for "Aspiration 4: peaceful and secure Africa" as follows:

> "By 2023, all inter and intra national conflicts would have ceased and the target of silencing of all guns on the continent would have been attained. Local and national mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution would be entrenched and functioning for the cause of peace. The African Stand by Force, the Defence and Security Policy and the African Peace and Security Architecture in general will all be in place and be contributing towards the preservation and maintenance of peace in the continent and around the world[9]."

The "Silence the guns by 2020" idea was not meant merely to be a slogan but a commitment that guides a critical aspect of the AU's decisions and processes for the socio-economic development of Africa[10]. The commitment is also framed as a "Fast Track Project or Initiative" in the first 10-year plan of Agenda 2063 and it must be implemented in that context, while progress is to be monitored through the establishment and operationalization of an African Human Security Index (AHSI).[11]

Under "Goal 14: A Stable and Peaceful Africa,[12]" the AUC Implementation Plan contains a detailed table for "key process actions and milestones towards 2023" to achieve an AU Framework. For example, under "Silencing the guns by 2020" the target date set for domesticating a continent-wide policy and cooperation framework was 2017, and "strengthening of the role of the local communities to

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[8] African Union Comission, *First Ten-Year Implementation Plan: 2014-2023* (2015), https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf.
[9] African Union Commission, *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (2015)*.
[10] Ibid, p. 16,39.
African Union, *50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration* (2013), https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/29149-wd-50_declaration_en.pdf

[12] African Union Commission, *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (2015)*.

keep communities free of guns" was to be achieved by 2019. Also, "complete civilian control of security services within democratic practices, rule of law and due processes" was to be achieved by 2025. It is evident from the examination below that the first two key milestones for Goal 14 mentioned above have not been reached and need to reviewed,

To identify critical measures that can be taken in the short term, the AU Peace and Security Council – supported by the AU Economic Social & Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) – the AUC, African regional organizations, and civil society representatives met in Lusaka from 7 to 9 November 2016 to devise a "Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by 2020.[13] These practical steps are wide ranging and include political and legal aspects, not only related to stopping illicit flows of weapons, but also to such matters as operational capacity and agreements for deployment of the African Standby Force, early warning signs for looming crises, the "deficits in enhancing and deepening democracy, respect for human dignity, human rights and good governance, sanctions and punitive measures in cases of proven violation of AU instruments on governance and corruption that lead to conflict." The practical steps and modalities relating to the prevention of illicit arms transfers are set out in this paper further below, after outlining the current challenges.

Threats Posed by the Proliferation and Misuse of Arms

In much of Africa, the proliferation and misuse of arms – especially small arms, light weapons, and their ammunition – has been driven for many decades not just by the lack of robust regulations but by the legacy of colonialism. This legacy includes deficits in governance in the form of weak institutions, constricted political spaces, corrupt practices, and non-inclusive processes. These, alongside other factors such as ethnic rivalries, combined with exogenous factors, particularly the Cold War, made Africa's peace and security landscape particularly volatile. The continent was the theatre of numerous inter-state conflicts, which were only overtaken both in frequency and intensity by intra-state conflicts after the end of the Cold War.

Many of the armed conflicts in the early decades after independence were still fueled by external interests and had their roots in economic factors. For example, mineral-rich areas were encouraged to secede with support of external forces to facilitate their easy access to these resources (e.g. Shaba in DRC in the 1960s).[14] These conflicts left behind a legacy of failed and ungovernable States, insecurity, and lack of development – the effects of which are still being felt today.

[13] African Union, *Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020: Lusaka Master Road Map* (2016).
[14] Egide, Rwamatwara. "Forced Migration in Africa: A Challenge to Development." *Vienna Magazine for Critical African Studies* 8 (2005).

A deplorable effect of conflict and insecurity in Africa is the forced displacement of millions of people, particularly women and children, coupled with the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and the phenomenon of child soldiers. These displacements date back to colonial times and continue. Today, there are nearly 3.4 million refugees and 5.4 million internally displaced persons. This, combined with stateless, people brings the total number of forcibly displaced to 11 million in Africa in 2014.

Africa's conflicts also led to the diversion of resources away from critical development imperatives. In some countries, there were prolonged periods of conflicts lasting over 20 years (Angola, Mozambique, Sudan), during which a great proportion of the country's resources were directed to war efforts. Africa's regional and sub-regional organizations, the OAU/AU, and the regional economic communities (RECs), dedicated much of their efforts on peace and security issues at the expense of pursuing their primary mandates of accelerating the continent's economic development and integration. Similarly, Africa's engagement with the rest of the world was generally dominated by calls for the international community to underwrite the cost of the continent's conflicts, as well as to pressure its leadership to get its governance right.

Over the last decades, there has also been a decline in the number of armed conflicts on the continent, despite the intractable character of several old conflicts, the emergence of new ones in places such as South Sudan, Central African Republic, the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and parts of West Africa. There have also emerged high rates of armed crime in some countries. The positive changes have been bolstered by the sustained economic growth in several countries, increasing trends towards electoral democracy as opposed to unconstitutional changes of government, and the progress made in combating corruption in many countries.

It's also significant that although Africa continues to solicit the support of the international community in the management of its conflicts, in the past decade and a half the continent has successfully put in place through the AU an elaborate peace and security architecture (APSA). The APSA's intention is to address the entire gamut of Africa's peace and security challenges, from prevention, through conflict management to post-conflict reconstruction and development. The APSA complements the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and together, they hold great promise for the entrenchment of well-governed, secure and peaceful African States, which would facilitate the emergence of the Africa that is envisioned in Agenda 2063.

Yet, despite these significant achievements, the continent still faces tremendous challenges, particularly evidenced by recent increases in conflict since 2010, as well as violence and civil protests with the potential to degenerate into civil wars [15].

[15] The Third High-Level Dialogue on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance in Africa held in Dakar, Senegal, October 30-31, 2014.

Undermining Development

Particularly in contexts of armed conflict, the abuse of arms can lead to the damage, destruction and/or closure of civilian infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, places of work, markets, residential areas, buildings and areas of religious and cultural significance, as well as to a breakdown in basic services.[16] Incompatibility of positions, competition over scarce resources, behavioral characteristics, and mutually opposed goals are some of the factors driving conflicts. Thus, the need exists to build conflict resolution, conflict de-escalation, and threat minimization mechanisms, as well as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for intra/inter-state and cross border conflicts.

There are also increasing threats posed by emerging transnational crimes such as terrorism and violent extremism, drug trafficking, piracy, illicit arms proliferation, human trafficking and smuggling, and money laundering. Other threats include the rise in urbanization, social exclusion and unemployment; conflicts over transboundary resources (e.g. water, oil, gas, and minerals); and the impact of climate change and other factors (e.g. population growth) triggering new conflicts over resources.

The Biennial Meeting of States on the UNPoA held in June 2016 at UN Headquarters welcomed the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which replaced the MDGs in 2015, as a "defining moment for global efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons". SDG Goal 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions, represents a significant step towards recognizing the importance of robust arms control to allow sustainable development, and particularly Target 16.4, which reads: "*By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime*." The Indicator for Target 16.4 can also be used by Member States to develop national and regional indicators required for measuring progress under the SDGs. However, much greater efforts need to be made by States, especially in Africa and Asia, to submit reliable data on armed violence and on the trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their seizure, discovery and surrender.[17]

Other targets for SDG 16 closely related to 16.4 include: target 16.1 (Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere), target 16.2 (End

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[16] See for example: *How an Arms Trade Treaty can help Prevent Armed Violence.* London: Amnesty International and International Action Network on Small Arms, 2011. https://aser-asso.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/How-an-Arms-Trade-Treaty-can-help-prevent-Armed-Violence-IANSA-Amnesty-International-Fevrier-2011.pdf

[17] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Study On Firearms: A Study on the Transnational Nature of and Routes and Modus Operandi Used in Trafficking in Firearms* (Vienna, UNODC, 2015), https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/UNODC_Study_on_Firearms_WEB.pdf
Only 45 countries participated with the Study, and only 39 of those provided data on seizures of illicit firearms.

abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children), target 16.3 (Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all), target 16.5 (Substantially reduce corruption and bribery), target 16.6 (develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels), and 16.7 (Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels)

SDG 16 is also closely related to the prevention of gender-based violence. SDG 5 aims to: "Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls," which includes Target 5.2 (eliminating all forms of violence against all women and girls). However, gender disaggregated armed violence data is difficult to find in Africa, hindering the assessments of the extent and nature of the gendered impacts of small arms on the continent. In 2016 it was estimated that 84 per cent of people worldwide who died violently were men and boys, and they also appear most often in victim statistics in Africa.[18] However, across the world women and girls are the primary victims of homicides resulting from intimate partner violence.[19] Reliable statistics are not available for all subregions in Africa, but Southern Africa is estimated to experience the highest female violent death rate in the world, averaging 9.4 per 100,000 women during the period 2011–16.[20] Systematic reporting and research are required to paint a detailed picture of the gender dimensions of firearms-related violence in non-conflict settings. Moreover, the negative impacts of small arms extend beyond physical security to the social and economic spheres.

The Illicit Arms Markets

The illicit arms market involves various actors, ranging from manufacturers to the end-users, and includes illicit brokers, who conceal their acts within a highly complex transnational organized criminal network.[21] The clandestine nature of arms trafficking makes it inherently difficult for anyone outside of these networks to discern the actors involved; it is far easier to see the effects of trafficking than identify traffickers and illicit brokers. In Africa, the illicit arms market is fed by various sources – the diversion of weapons from government stockpiles (i.e. legitimate stocks), from battlefields, and from international sources acting in complicity with internal actors.

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[18] N.Florquin, S.Lipott, and F.Wairagu, *Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa*. (Geneva: Small Arms Survey and African Union, 2020. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-AU-Weapons-Compass.pdf

[19] McEvoy, Claire and Hideg, Gergely, *Global Violent Deaths 2017: Time to Decide.* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2017, pp. 63-4. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-Report-GVD2017.pdf

[20] Ibid.
Egide, Rwamatwara. "Forced Migration in Africa: A Challenge to Development." *Vienna Magazine for Critical African Studies* 8 (2005).

[21] Rothe, Dawn and Collins, Victoria. "An Exploration of Applying System Criminality to Arms Trafficking." *International Criminal Justice Review* 2, 1 (2011).

It is very difficult in Africa to find recent cases where arms dealers, including arms brokers, have been prosecuted successfully.[22] Even in situations where arms and/or ammunition have been detected in suspicious circumstances, the case often evaporates as quickly as it surfaces. In most instances, authorities do not undertake investigations that would lead to prosecution.

For instance, Conflict Armament Research, a UK-based NGO that monitors the movement of arms globally, released a report in 2013 that identified 10 cases of ammunition circulation in illicit markets. The report pointed out that the ammunition had been traced to nine countries – Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Guinea, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.[23] Yet none of the authorities in these countries addressed the findings. Indeed, it is rare to see instances where States try to validate such research findings and follow through by investigating such cases to prosecute perpetrators.

Informal discussions with senior policymakers, experts, and academics within the AU, the RECs, and research and training organisations suggest that the sensitivity of arms related matters make most African countries reluctant to disclose acts of arms trafficking within their territories, as it would be shameful for a country to acknowledge that such activities were taking place in their territory.

There are several reasons for this. First is fear of the negative image that could accompany such disclosure, especially within the community of nations. Secondly, to move large consignments of arms, whether licit or illicit, there is a need for an elaborate and efficient network or supply chain of interconnected actors. This often involves government authorities, influential politicians and high-profile business actors. The 2004 case of Mark Thatcher and his South African accomplice and arms dealer, Nick du Toit, and others illustrates this point.[24] This exceptional case of an attempted coup by mercenaries would have evaded detection had the flight carrying the coup plotters not stopped in Harare, Zimbabwe in route to Equatorial Guinea.[25]

Another case took place in 2008. In the run-up to the general elections in Zimbabwe, a Chinese vessel, the An Yue Jiang, attempted to deliver a cargo of 77 tonnes of arms and ammunition – including bullets, mortar bombs, grenades, and assault rifles. Destined for Zimbabwe, the shipment was to arrive at the Durban Port in South Africa, from where it would be transported by land to Zimbabwe. This was after Russia and

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[22] Wood, Brian, and Danssaert, Peter. "Africa and the Grey Market" *The Journal of Good Governance in Africa*, 52 (2020).
[23] "Iranian Ammunition Spreading Through Africa." *Defence Web,* January, 2013. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.
[24] Benneto, Jason, "South African Arms Dealer Faces Death Over the Failed Coup." *The Independent,* August, 2004. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/southafrican-arms-dealer-faces-death-over-failed-coup-558249. HTML.
[25] Wines, Michael. "Thatcher's Son Held in Failed Africa Coup," *The New York Times*, August, 2004. http://www.nytimes. com/2004/08/26/world/thatcher-s-son-held-in-failed-africacoup.html.

China vetoed a UN Security Council resolution on Zimbabwe in July 2008.[26] The resolution would have imposed an arms embargo on Zimbabwe. Suspecting that the arms would be used in serious human rights violations, civil society in South Africa and the SADC region raised the alarm and dubbed the vessel the 'ship of shame'.[27] A court ruling rescinded the initial transfer authorization. At the same time, the neighbouring States of Mozambique, Namibia, and Angola are said to have refused the ship permission to dock.[28] It remains unclear, however, whether the arms eventually reached Zimbabwe or not.

Internal Diversion of Arms

Licit stocks are one of the main sources of illicit arms flows in Africa. Most illegally circulated weapons were manufactured legally. Diversion refers to the entry into the illicit market, or the unauthorized use or re-export of arms or ammunition without the consent of the legitimate owner or original exporting state.[29]

In Africa, diversion occurs in several ways. One is when armed militias or rebels overrun government forces and raid government arsenals, or when rogue soldiers trade arms with rebels in return for payment. This is most rampant in cases where government forces are underpaid.

Diversions also occur in peacekeeping missions. In 2017, the Small Arms Survey, an independent research institution, undertook a review of SADC peace missions deployed in Lesotho, DRC and Mozambique by the AU/SADC and the UN over a period of 12 years. Within this period, it was estimated that there were at least 22 notable incidents in which peacekeeping troops lost arms and ammunition. The study defines 'notable' as those cases in which peacekeepers lose ten or more firearms or 500 or more rounds of ammunition. In almost half of the cases, the scale of the loss was put at 50 to 99 firearms and between 2,500 and 4,999 rounds or a loss of over 100 firearms or 5,000 rounds of ammunition . One such incident alone resulted in the loss of more than 500,000 rounds of ammunition. Four other incidents probably involved losses of at least 10,000 cartridges.[30]

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[26] Nasaw, Daniel. "China and Russia Veto Zimbabwe Sanctions," *The Guardian*, July, 2008. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/ jul/11/unitednations.Zimbabwe.

[27]Jeuck, Lucas, *Arms Transfers to Zimbabwe: Implications for an Arms Trade Treaty*, (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2011). https://www.sipri.org/publications/2011/sipri-background-papers/arms-transfers-zimbabwe-implications-arms-trade-treaty

[28] Zoyab, Alaphia, *No More Ships of Shame to Africa,* (New York: Amnesty International, 2017). https://www.amnestyusa.org/no-more-ships-of-shame-toafrica/.

[29] Loughran, Chris, *" Practical Disarmament Initiative: Stockpile Management and Diversion Prevention,"* (Manchester: Mine Advisory Group and UNSCAR, 2015). https://mag-20180803141540142800000002.s3.amazonaws.com/dev/media/filer_public/9b/0d/9b0da0c1-9aaf-4423-88eb-d3851459b1b6/practical-disarmament-initaitive.pdf

[30] Berman, Eric and Racovita, Mihaela, "*Diversion of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations Observations Based on Missions in Sudan and South Sudan,"*(Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 2015). http://www.smallarmssurvey. org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-ResearchNote-54.pdf.

State-owned arms can also leak into illicit circulation through corrupt sales, theft, or surrender to an enemy. A typical example is the case of the DRC. At the height of the March 23 Movement (known as M23) rebellion in the eastern DRC, President Joseph Kabila dismissed his commander of the land forces, General Gabriel Amisi Kumba, over accusations that he had been involved in an arms trafficking network that supplied arms and ammunition to rebel groups.[31] The diversion of weapons was cited as the main cause of the M23 rebels' victory over government forces in November 2012.[32] The rebels overran Goma with the help of the diverted arms and ammunition. After entering Goma, they looted government armouries.[33]

Incidents of illicit arms flow continue to be recorded across the continent in defiance of the AU and regional measures that are in place to prevent them. With greater transparency – which could be achieved by better sharing of information within the continent – and by implementing measures such as UN arms embargoes, it may well become much easier to detect and disrupt illicit arms flows than was the case during the Cold War era.

Counter-Terrorism and Violent Extremism

The UN Secretary-General has addressed the relationship between gender, small arms, and violent extremism. The Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (A/70/674) recognizes the impact of terrorism on women and the importance of gender equality and empowering women and girls in combatting the drivers of violent extremism.

A study on firearms by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published in 2015 provides details of the intricacies relating to transnational organized criminal networks that interweave Africa and the other parts of the world. The study confirms the existence of smuggling routes between Europe and Africa facilitating the flow of illicit weapons.[34]

The same study revealed that in Burkina Faso, a landlocked country, all the illicit weapons that had been seized were transported by land. Ghana, Burkina Faso's neighbour, declared that most of its seizures of illicit weapons were transported by

[31]"DRC Army Chief Suspended for 'Smuggling Arms'," *Al Jazeera*, November, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/ news/africa/2012/11/201211235522485 2821.html.
[32] Jones, Pete and Smith, David. "Congo Rebels Take Goma With Little Resistance and to Little Cheer," *The Guardian*, November, 2012. https://www. theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/20/congo-rebel-m23take-goma.
[33]United Nations Group of Experts, *Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (UN Group of Experts, 2014) .https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1421515.pdf.
[34] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Study On Firearms: A Study on the Transnational Nature of and Routes and Modus Operandi Used in Trafficking in Firearms* (Vienna, UNODC, 2015).

land, sea, and air.[35] Ghana reported that some of the seized weapons were destined for Nigeria by land, implying that Togo and Benin may have become unsuspecting transit countries, according to the study. [36]

African Participation in Key Binding Instruments

International and African regional instruments containing legally or politically binding obligations and commitments can provide an essential basis for preventing the proliferation and misuse of arms in Africa. So too, AU instruments and decisions about peace, security, and governance provide a solid framework to address challenges to peace and security. However, the culture of implementation of these instruments and decisions amongst African countries is still seriously lacking. There is a crucial need for a scrupulous and systematic implementation of instruments and decisions adopted by AU and RECs policy organs.[37]

African States have participated in the development of several international instruments, including the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (1980) and its various Protocols, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990), the Mine Ban Treaty (1997), the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol) (2001) supplementing the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the UNPoA (2001) supplemented by the International Tracing Instrument (2005), the Cluster Munitions Convention (2008), and the Arms Trade Treaty (2013). African States have also established their own binding regional instruments.

In Africa, the binding regional instruments are the Protocol of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on the control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Materials (2001); the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in East Africa, the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (2002); the Convention of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms, Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2006); and the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used For Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention) (2010).

Together, these binding instruments form a common framework of obligations and guidelines to initiate and sustain concerted action by African governments. Building national capacity for such action evidently requires more dedicated international assistance in many countries. While all African States have participated in these developments, in many cases they have not ratified all of the relevant international

[35] Ibid, 55
[36] Ibid, 53
[37] High-Level Conferences and Retreats on Governance and Peace and Security.

and regional treaties, and even if they have become state parties they have not fully implemented the instruments. Yet, to establish a common legal and policy framework to develop coherent action plans to prevent arms proliferation and misuse, it is paramount that all African States ratify and implement these instruments through national measures and international cooperation. It should be a priority to do so by the end of 2020.

The following two tables illustrate the participation of SADC member States in binding instruments that should be strictly implemented.

SADC – Participation in Main Conventional Arms Binding Instruments (2019)

Name of State	Party to Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)[i]	Reported on ATT	Party to UN Firearms Protocol	Party to SADC Firearms Protocol	Last Report on UN Programme on Small Arms and Light Weapons
Angola		No	19/09/2014		2014
Botswana	07/06/2019	No		08/11/2004	2018
Comoros					2018
DRC		No	28/10/2005		2018
Eswatini		No	24/09/2012	01/09/2006	2018
Lesotho	25/01/2016		24/09/2003	08/11/2004	2018
Madagascar	22/08/2016		15/09/2005		2018
Malawi		No	17/03/2005	01/11/2004	2010
Mauritius	23/07/2015		24/09/2003	08/11/2004	2018
Mozambique	14/12/2018	No	20/09/2006	01/11/2004	2016
Namibia		No		08/11/2004	2018
Seychelles	02/11/2015	Yes			
South Africa	22/12/2014	Yes	20/02/2004	08/11/2004	2016
Tanzania		No	24/05/2006	08/11/2004	2018
Zambia	20/05/2016	Yes	24/04/2005	08/11/2004	2018
Zimbabwe		No		20/03/2006	2008

SADC – Participation in Main Conventional Weapons Ban Treaties (2019)

Name of State	Party to Conventional Weapons Convention	Party to Mine Ban Treaty	Party to Cluster Munitions Ban Convention
Angola		05/07/2002	
Botswana		01/03/2000	27/06/2011
Comoros		19/09/2002	28/07/2010
DRC		02/05/2002	
Eswatini		22/12/1998	13/09/2011
Lesotho	06/09/2000	02/12/1998	28/05/2010
Madagascar	14/03/2008	16/09/1999	20/05/2017
Malawi		13/08/1998	07/10/2009
Mauritius	06/05/1996	03/12/1997	01/10/2015
Mozambique		25/08/1998	14/03/2011
Namibia		21/09/1998	31/08/2018
Seychelles	08/06/2000	02/06/2000	20/05/2010
South Africa	13/09/1995	26/06/1998	28/05/2015
Tanzania		13/11/2000	
Zambia	25/09/2013	23/02/2001	12/08/2009
Zimbabwe		18/06/1998	

Sources for the Tables above are: Treaties.un.org, Thearmstradetreaty.org, https://www.apminebanconvention.org, https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw/programme-of-action/

There are many other treaties that African States are party to, or should be party to, that can also respond to the persistent problem of forcibly displaced peoples. This problem has led to the introduction of landmark instruments as such as:

(i) The 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; and
(ii) The 2009 AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, considered the first legal instrument of its kind. Nonetheless, issues of forced displacement, including many protracted refugee situations, continue to plague many parts of the continent and urgent measures are needed to tackle the root causes as well as find durable solutions for those affected.

The importance of good governance and functional democracy in preventing and effectively managing conflicts cannot be overstressed. Most of the conflicts in Africa occurred due to deficiencies in ensuring accountable, transparent and inclusive governance systems, as well as inadequate efforts to address the challenges of poverty and inequality. Addressing poverty and deficits in governance will go a long way in reducing conflicts and strengthening the peace and security of persons, communities, and nation States, and will contribute significantly to the socio-economic transformation of the continent envisaged under Agenda 2063.

Examples of Arms proliferation and armed violence in the SADC region

An outline of small arms proliferation and armed violence in the SADC region, which has largely overcome armed conflict, can be gleaned from the following data on five countries.[38]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

In July 2003 the UN Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo on all armed groups and militias operating in eastern DRC.[39] Transfers to the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and those parts of the Congolese armed and police forces integrated under national control were exempt.[40] In March 2004 the Security Council established the Sanctions Committee on the DRC and a Group of Experts to monitor the implementation of the

38 The data for his outline is largely taken from www.gunpolicy.org.

[39] *UN Security Council Resolution 1493, The Situation Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo,* S/Res/1493. *(28 July 2012), available from http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1493.*

[40] On 1 July 2010 MONUC was renamed the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

arms embargo.[41] During the 2000s, States bordering the DRC were repeatedly accused by the Group of Experts on the DRC of channelling weapons and munitions to the different armed groups and militias operating in the east of the country.[42] The main armed groups active in DRC have been the Ugandan-led Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), in addition to a myriad of Congolese Mai-Mai groups. In 2019 and early 2020 tensions were mounting in the Great Lakes region among Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, all of which allegedly back insurgents based in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).[43]

It is estimated that in 2017, civilians in the DRC held a total of 946,000 guns (both licit and illicit). However, the number of registered guns in the DRC was reported to be only 216 in 2017. The defence forces of the DRC are reported to have 161,100 firearms and police forces in the DRC reported to have 46,000 firearms.[44]

Gun Deaths: According to the UNODC, in 2015 the DRC experienced an estimated maximum of 13.4 homicides per 100,000 people.[45] No data is available for 2017 or 2018. Given the upsurges in armed clashes in the DRC during recent years, the rate of violent deaths facilitated by use of small arms is likely to be higher. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the New York University-based Congo Research Group reported in August 2019 that in the Kivu provinces alone, 1,900 civilians were killed and 3,300 others were kidnapped between June 2017-June 2019[46].

Import and Export Regulation: DRC firearm and ammunition exports are subject to transfer control laws but the government has lacked capacity to control the very long and remote borders. The annual value of small arms and ammunition exports from the DRC is reported by Customs to be $754 USD. The DRC informed the Small Arms Survey that industrial production of small arms, their parts, or ammunition does not take place in their state (AU and Small Arms Survey, 2018). Yet independent sources point to ammunition producers in the DRC.[47] The annual value of small arms and ammunition imports to the DRC is reported by Customs to be $26,435 USD. However, this is likely to be an underestimate as it is reported by many sources that the level of firearm and ammunition smuggling inside the DRC and across some its borders is much higher. The activities of arms brokers and transfer intermediaries are supposed

[41]UN Security Council Resolution 1533, *The Situation Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo,* S/Res/1533. (12 March 2004), available from http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1533.
[42] Bromley, Mark and Holtom, Paul, *Arms Transfers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Assessing the System of Arms Transfer Notifications, 2008-2010* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010).
[43] *Averting Proxy Wars in the Eastern DR Congo and Great Lakes, Briefing 150* (Nairobi: International Crisis Group, 2020).
[44] Holtom, Paul and Havesi, Irene, *Trade Update 2018 in Sub Saharan Africa,* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2018).
[45] The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
[46] Misser, Francois, "Rivers of Arms" *The Journal of Good Governance in Africa*, 52 (2020).
[47] Holtom and Havesi, 2018.

to be regulated by existing laws. Between 2013 and 2016, items such as gun towers and tankers were delivered to the DRC at a cost of over $10 million USD.[48] The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo/ Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) have failed to manage their stockpiles in the past. Radio France Internationale (RFI) reported in March 2018 that ammunition used by the FARDC and the rebels sometimes came from the same stockpiles.[49]

International Controls: The DRC is a party to three binding regional instruments on small arms and light weapons, namely the SADC Protocol, Nairobi Protocol, and the Kinshasa Convention. The DRC also ratified the ATT and the Firearms Protocol. In 2007, the DRC signed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, a diplomatic initiative aimed at addressing the interrelations between armed violence and development.

Additional Factors Relevant for the Silencing the Guns Strategy: The DRC submitted its last UNPoA report in 2018.[50] In the report, the DRC requested international assistance for legal regulations and administrative procedures. They participated in the review of the SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials.

Namibia

It is estimated that civilians held a total of 396,000 of guns (both licit and illicit) in Namibia during 2017.[51] The number of registered guns in Namibia is reported to be 200,000.[52] Unregistered and unlawfully held guns cannot be counted, but in Namibia there are estimated to be 195,990. An average of 6,653gun licences are issued annually.[53] The defence forces of Namibia are reported to have 11,880 firearms and police forces are reported to have 15,000 firearms.

Gun Deaths: Between 2011 and 2019, the authorities reported a total of 1,759 cases of attempted murder with firearms.[54] During the same period, police reported that 525 people were murdered with a firearm, and 3,045 cases of armed robbery and 3,198 cases of a firearm being pointed at someone took place.[55]

Import and Export Regulation: Namibia has firearm and ammunition exports control laws. UN Comtrade reported that small arms and ammunition exports from Namibia

[48] SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
[49] Misser, 2020.
[50] United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), Democratic Republic of the Congo* (New York, UNODA, 2018).
[51] www.gunpolicy.org
[52] Dempers, Pauline, *Link Between GBV and Arms Trade*, (Nambia, NANGOF, December 2019).
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.

during 2013 and 2015 amounted to $3.4 million USD.[56] Namibia informed the Small Arms Survey that industrial production of small arms, their parts, or ammunition does not take place in their state (AU and Small Arms Survey, 2018). Yet independent sources point to ammunition producers in Namibia.[57] From 2013–15, the UN Comtrade data indicates Namibia was one the five largest arms importers in the Sub Sahara. During the period between 2013 and 2015, small arms and ammunition imports to Namibia were reported by UN Comtrade to be $32.2 million USD.[58] In Namibia, the activities of arms brokers and transfer intermediaries are not yet specifically regulated under the law.

International Controls: Namibia has signed, but not yet ratified the ATT. It has not signed the Firearms Protocol or the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development

Additional Factors Relevant for the Silencing the Guns Strategy: The National Focal Point (NFP) on SALW organised a strategic planning workshop in 2018, which has yet to be tabled for the government to approve. There is some concern that the draft National Action Plan does not mention having a comprehensive law since the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1992's amendments are still pending. Those amendments were tabled in the National Assembly, but there has been no progress since then.

The Namibian government adopted a National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325) and is championing the Agenda for Women Peace and Security in Africa. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs recently addressed the 5th ATT Conference of State Parties on Women Peace and Security.

Namibia submitted its last UNPoA report in 2018. In the report, Namibia requested international assistance regarding legal regulations and administrative procedures. Its most current law directly applicable to SALW was adopted in 1996.[59]

South Africa

As of late 2014 (the latest data available) 90 percent of gun owners in South Africa are civilians. Of the 1,763,161 licensed gun owners in South Africa at that time (excluding the South African Police Service (SAPS)) 1,753,839 were civilians, 2,330 were private security companies, 6,569 were non-official institutions other than

[56] Holtom, Paul and Havesi, Irene, *Trade Update 2018 in Sub Saharan Africa,* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2018).
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), Namibia* (New York, UNODA, 2018).
Holtom, Paul and Havesi, Irene, *Trade Update 2018 in Sub Saharan Africa,* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2018).

security companies, and 423 were government departments excluding SAPS. [60] From 2017to 2018 figures show that civilians reported the loss or theft of 8,867 guns that year (an average of 24 a day) while members of the police force lost 358 guns (an average of one a day). [61] Over the years, various incidents of legal guns being leaked into the illegal pool by insiders have come to light. For instance, guns handed in during the 2010 national firearms amnesty program were later discovered in an illicit arms cache in Johannesburg in 2014.[62]

Gun Deaths: In 2016/17, a SAPS murder study estimated that between 18 and 21 people were shot and killed a day while in 2017/18 this increased to 23 people a day. [63]

Import and Export Regulation: In South Africa, firearm and ammunition exports are restricted under the transfer control law. The annual number of firearms exported from South Africa was reported by manufacturers to be 1,278 in 2018. The annual number of firearms imported to South Africa was reported to be 63,960 in 2018. Reports suggest that the level of firearm and ammunition smuggling within South Africa is relatively high. In South Africa, certain activities of arms brokers and arms transfer intermediaries are specifically regulated under the law, including where such activities by South African nationals are conducted outside the country.

International Controls: South Africa has signed and ratified the ATT and reflected this in its national legislation. South Africa has also signed and ratified the Firearms Protocol. In 2006, South Africa signed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development.

Additional Factors Relevant for the Silencing the Guns Strategy: In June 2015, the SAPS reported that a Memorandum of Understanding was entered into with the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) under which "a bilateral and technical committee" was established to address "all issues relating to the evaluation and assessment of the (firearms) system, (including) assessing the level to which the contractor had implemented under the contractual obligations.[64] This process was continuing, with meetings every second week of the month. A few months after entering into this agreement with the CSIR, the SAPS reported that the FRS (Firearms

[60] Taylor, Claire. *Gun Control and Violence: South Africa's Story,* (Johannesburg, Gun Free South Africa, 2018). https://www.gfsa.org.za/take-action/resources/send/13-research/114-gun-control-and-violence-south-africa-s-story.
[61] South African Police Service, *Annual Report 2018,* (Johannesburg, South African Police Service, 2018).
[62] Hosken, Grame. "Cops Leaking Guns," *The Sunday Times,* June, 2014. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2014-06-04-cops-leaking-guns/
[63] Taylor, Claire. *Gun Control and Violence: South Africa's Story,* (Johannesburg, Gun Free South Africa, 2018).
[64] South African Police Service, *Annual Report 2015,* (Johannesburg, South African Police Service, 2015).

Register System), with all its functions, was migrated to the EFRS (Enhanced Firearms Register System) to "enhance production".[65]

In 2014, police recovered an arms cache that included R1, R4, R5 and AK-47 rifles and approximately 300 handguns in a raid on a Johannesburg home.[66] Lawrence Mamogobo, a designated firearms officer based at the Pretoria Central police station, was sentenced to 13 years in mid-2015 after being convicted on 30 counts of corruption involving fraudulently selling falsified firearms training certificates, competency certificates and licences.[67]

In 2019, South Africa adopted a National Action Plan on SCR 1325, and during the UN General Assembly the government invited South African women working in both the South African Defence Force and Police Services to address the Assembly. Since the adoption of that strategy, South African authorities have organised an annual gun amnesty and have managed to collect more than 30,000.[68] In 2016/17 alone, 15,148 guns were voluntary surrendered.

South Africa submitted its last UNPoA report in 2016[69] and should be encouraged to submit a 2018 report before the 2020 report is due.

Tanzania

It is estimated that civilians held 427,000 of guns (both licit and illicit) in Tanzania in 2017, while the defence forces of Tanzania were reported to have 190,050 firearms and the police in Tanzania were reported to have approximately 37,000 firearms. [70]

Gun Deaths: Firearms related deaths in Tanzania are reported to be low. The Small Arms Survey estimated there were 8.3 violent deaths per 100,000 in 2016.[71]

Import and Export Regulation: In Tanzania, firearm and ammunition exports are restricted under the transfer control law. The annual value of small arms and ammunition exports from Tanzania is reported by Customs to be $3,558 USD. The annual value of small arms and ammunition imports to Tanzania is reported by Customs to be $374,336 USD. There have been reports in the past of small arms

[65] Ibid.
[66] South African Police Service, *Annual Report 2018,* (Johannesburg, South African Police Service, 2018).
[67] Taylor, Claire. *Gun Control and Violence: South Africa's Story,* (Johannesburg, Gun Free South Africa, 2018).
[68] Ibid.
[69] United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), South Africa* (New York, UNODA, 2018).
[70] www.gunpolicy.org
[71] Small Arms Survey Database on Violent Deaths, 2017.

smuggling across the border to Burundi and DRC opposition groups. Between 2015 and 2018, Tanzania imported patrol crafts - one of these was a transport helicopter.[72]

International Controls: Tanzania has signed but not yet ratified the ATT. It has signed and ratified the Firearms Protocol. Tanzania has not signed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development.

Additional Factors Relevant for the Silencing the Guns Strategy: Tanzania submitted its last UNPoA report in 2018.[73] In the report, Tanzania requested international assistance for laws, regulations and administrative procedures. Tanzania together with other SADC Member States participated in the review of the SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials to align the protocol with the ATT.

Zambia

It is estimated that civilians held a total of 158,000 firearms (both licit and illicit) in Zambia in 2017. The defence forces of Zambia are reported to have 41,407 firearms and the police force in Zambia is reported to have 16,0008 firearms.[74]

Gun Deaths: In Zambia, annual firearm homicides and suicides remain low. The Small Arms Survey estimated there were 6.3 violent deaths per 100,000 people in 2016.[75]

Import and Export Regulation: In Zambia, firearm and ammunition exports are restricted under the transfer control law. UN Comtrade recorded USD $49 million worth of small arms exported from Zambia to CAR in 2015, but this was said to be solely for the Zambian contingent of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission.[76] Zambia is not a major exporter of firearms. The annual value of small arms and ammunition exports from Zambia is reported by Customs to be $5,170 USD. Turkey submitted a report to the UN Register for 2013 and 2016 containing limited information on small arms deliveries to Africa, mentioning only five States including Zambia.[77] Turkey exported 30 semi-automatic pistols to Zambia. In Zambia, the activities of arms brokers and transfer intermediaries are not specifically regulated under its national law.

International Controls: Zambia has signed and ratified the ATT. It has also signed and ratified the Firearms Protocol. In 2007, Zambia signed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development.

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[72] SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
[73] United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), Tanzania* (New York, UNODA, 2018).
[74] www.gunpolicy.org
[75] Small Arms Survey Database on Violent Deaths, 2017
[76] Holtom, Paul and Havesi, Irene, *Trade Update 2018 in Sub Saharan Africa,* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2018).
[77] Ibid.

Additional Factors Relevant for the Silencing the Guns Strategy: Zambia has been a strong advocate of the vision for Silencing the Guns in Africa.[78] Zambia hosted an African Union Peace and Security Council meeting, during which the Lusaka Road Map was crafted. Zambia has observed the AU's Gun Amnesty Month in September, and in 2018 the Zambian government organized a three-day workshop on preventing the illicit trade in small arms. The first two days were to review and plan for law enforcement and security institutions, and the last day for developing the role of civil society and the media.[79] Zambia submitted its last UNPoA report in 2018. In that report, the Zambian government requested international assistance for legal regulations and administrative procedures.[80]

Gender equality and women's empowerment

Aspiration 6 of Agenda 2063 aims to achieve "an Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, particularly its women and youth, and caring for children." Under this aspiration, Agenda 2063 envisages a continent that has equal participation, opportunity, and access for all segments of the continent's population to development outcomes and social and political discourse regardless of gender, political affiliation, religion, ethnic affiliation, locality, age or other factors.

In some respects, African countries have made significant advances in reducing gender inequalities, particularly in the field of political participation. With an average of 21 percent of parliamentarians being women, Africa is the only region to double women's political participation in one decade. At 64 percent, Rwanda has the highest percentage of female parliamentarians in the world.

Gender and the UN Programme of Action on small arms: The 2001 UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (UNPoA) refers to women only in its preamble (para. 6) in which States expresses grave concern over the devastating consequences of illicit trade in small arms for children "as well as the negative impact on women and the elderly." Despite this, the linkage between women's engagement and small arms control has become, over the past years, one of the most frequently addressed aspects of the gender and disarmament nexus by member States and civil society alike. Many non-governmental organizations have highlighted the importance of integrating balanced perspectives of men, boys, women, and girls into policies to combat the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons as well as the correlation between the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the lack of

[78] African Union, *Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020: Lusaka Master Road Map* (2016).
[79] Ibid.
[80] United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), Zambia* (New York, UNODA, 2018).

women's participation in social and political life. Particular emphasis has also been placed on women-led local programs and capacity building initiatives that address small arms control.

In 2010, The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) released a study containing guidelines on "Mainstreaming gender for the effective implementation of the PoA" on the occasion of the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States to consider the implementation of the UNPoA. These guidelines were developed to assist practitioners in identifying concrete ways of mainstreaming gender perspectives in all relevant initiatives and operations, and at all stages — from information gathering and planning to implementation, monitoring and evaluation – in the process of effective implementation of the UNPoA. States have deepened their understanding of gender considerations relevant to the UNPoA in follow-up meetings to review its implementation. At the Second Review Conference of the UNPoA in 2012, States expressed "grave concern" over the negative impact of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons on women, men, children, youth, the elderly and persons with disabilities. Moreover, States called for further integrating women into efforts to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (A/CONF.192/2012/RC/4, Annex I, 2012 Declaration, para. 14).

Subsequently, at the Fifth and Sixth Biennial Meetings of States in 2014 and 2016 respectively, gender was also taken into account. The participation and representation of women in small arms control processes were emphasized in the outcome document of the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States (A/CONF.192/BMS/2014/2). At the Sixth Biennial Meeting, this language was expanded, including by insertion of a call for States to take into account the differing impacts of illicit small arms and light weapons on women, men, girls, and boys. In the outcome document of the Sixth Biennial Meeting, States made use of the word "gender" for the first time in a UNPoA context. This is important given the considerable impact of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons not only on the lives of women and girls but also on young men, both as victims and offenders.

These commitments by States were further elaborated at the Third Review Conference of the UNPoA in 2018. There, States "recognize[d] the need for strengthened participation of women in decision-making and implementation processes relating to the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument and reaffirm[ed] the need for States to mainstream gender dimensions in their implementation efforts".[81] States agreed to "encourage the full participation and representation of women, including in leadership roles and as agents of change, in

[81] United Nations General Assembly, *Outcome Document: The United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects* (New York, United Nations General Assembly, 2018) https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.192/2018/RC/3&referer=/english/&Lang=E.

policymaking, planning and implementation processes related to the Programme of Action, such as national small arms commissions and programmes relating to community safety, violence reduction, collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons and conflict prevention and resolution".[82] They pledged to "ensure coordination between national authorities responsible for the implementation of the Programme of Action and relevant ministries or other national authorities responsible for women's affairs or gender equality, as well as women's civil society groups".[83] Furthermore, they agreed to "encourage the collection of data disaggregated by gender on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, including through national reports, and to increase understanding of the gender-specific impacts of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, in particular for the purpose of improving corresponding national policies and programmes".[84]

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT): Adopted through a General Assembly vote (67/234 B (2013), Article 7 of the ATT includes a legally binding provision related to the prevention of transfers of arms and ammunition where they would be used for serious acts of gender-based violence (GBV). The GBV criteria included in the ATT addresses serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) specifically related to GBV. Article 7(4) under "Export and export assessment" requires that State parties, when making an export assessment, take into account the risk of the transferred conventional arms being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children. A State would be obligated to deny an arms transfer if it determines there is an "overriding risk" that weapons or items covered under the treaty would be used to commit or facilitate such acts of GBV Member States, United Nations entities, and civil society have undertaken various efforts to operationalize this provision of the Treaty, including through capacity building workshops and development of risk-assessment tools to assist States.

Women, Peace and Security Framework: Ever since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and the genesis of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda, the world has witnessed a slow pace and very little effort by governments to effectively incorporate women in all disarmament and arms control processes. This National Action Plan on WPS will assist to advance the involvement of women directly affected by armed violence, as well as the advancement of women-led policy initiatives.

There is wide recognition that the equal full and effective participation of both men and women in the creation and maintenance of a reliable security sector is vital to broader objectives of peace and security. The development of the WPS Agenda was supported by South Africa, which seeks to better integrate women as 'agents of change' in all peace and security processes.

[82] Ibid, paragraph II.74.
[83] Ibid, paragraph II.75.
[84] Ibid, paragraph II.79.

A primary assumption is that disarmament – both generally and in specific initiatives – can be strengthened through the integration of gender insights into disarmament debates, decision-making and actions, and through more equitable participation by women in decision-making. Thus, a crucial element of the work in this area is to identify potential synergies and opportunities to simultaneously support effective disarmament and greater gender equality.

Practical Steps to help Silence the Guns

The AU "Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by 2020" [85] sets out practical steps and modalities relating specifically to the prevention of illicit arms transfers, as follows:

1. **The illicit flow of arms/weapons into Africa**
   - Stop suppliers and recipients from promoting and sustaining illicit business in arms/weapons;
   - Collect, verify and provide information to the PSC on those involved in illicit arms/weapon trade;
   - Sign, ratify, and implement regional, continental and international instruments on illicit weapons and including relevant OAU/AU and RECs/RMs decisions and declarations;
   - Name and shame suppliers and recipients of illicit arms in public, including at Summit level;
   - Establish AU inquiry groups whenever information emerges concerning a country of origin transit, or destination and facilitators of movement payment, storage and use of illicit arms/weapons reaching Africa;
   - Enhance the capacity of Member States to identify, seize and destroy illicit weapons;
   - Identify and cut links with suppliers and recipients of illicit arms, including imposing bans in line with the Arms Trade Treaty.

2. **Illicit proliferation and circulation of arms/weapons inside Africa**
   - Stop rebel/insurgent groups, non-state actors, and their financiers and political backers from accessing weapons;
   - Address the issue of small arms and light weapons (SALW) as part of PSC's conflict management and resolution interventions, including through particular attention to the flow of ammunition into conflict zones;
   - Provision of capacity building support for national institutions mandated to detect and recover illicit arms;
   - Take measures to secure stockpiles in emergency and conflict situations;

[85] African Union, *Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020: Lusaka Master Road Map* (2016), pp.7-8.

- Enhance collaboration with the UN Security Council and its sanctions committees to ensure the effective enforcement and monitoring of arms embargoes, which should be extended to all parties engaged in conflict and distribution of SALW.

3. Persistence of illicit financial flows, including those directed to illegal arms transactions, financing of terrorism and external political interference

- Stop irregular and destabilizing financing and address all structural factors that facilitate illicit financial flows, including weak institutional governance and corruption
- Establish an African Agency to trace, recover and repatriate illicitly acquired financial resources;
- Build capacity of financial intelligence units, law enforcement agencies and criminal justice systems of Member States;
- Harmonize national legislations with relevant international instruments for combating illicit financial flows and money laundering;
- Establishment of an information-sharing system to enable financial intelligence units of Member States to share intelligence in combating illicit financial flows;
- Improve financial intelligence in AU Member States to neutralize illicit financial transactions;
- Strengthen legal and technical capacities for the speedy recovery of illicit and stolen assets;
- Organize capacity building programs for government officials responsible for preparing contracts;

4. Irregular migration, trafficking of humans, drugs and arms, and violence against women and children

- Dismantle the nexus between corruption/illicit financing/purchase of weapons/drugs/etc. and eradicate safe havens for recruiting and harbouring irregular migrants, clandestine goods and trafficked persons;
- Identify human traffickers;
- Combat organized crime and financing of terrorism including addressing of passport fraud;
- Encourage cooperation to expose traffickers in humans, drugs, and arms, including whistle blowing;
- Enhance cooperation and coordination among countries affected by the phenomenon of irregular migration, including origin, transit, destination, and neighbouring countries; and among the regional and multilateral bodies to effectively combat this vice;
- Reinforce the nexus in terms of actions between peace, security, and development;
- Prioritize the role of combating terrorism and terrorist groups as a major source and factor for irregular migration;
- Deploy focal points to take lead action;

- Promote zero tolerance for corruption and money laundering, and punish its perpetrators and facilitators
- Encourage Member States to sign, ratify and domesticate relevant AU and UN instruments on combating corruption. Launch and advance the campaign to End Corruption and Silence the Guns by 2020 within the AU and Regional Economic Communities by 2017 and in the Member States in 2018.

Every government in the SADC and other African countries should make an assessment of the relevance of the above practical steps and should draw up a national plan to prioritize, design, and implement the practical steps that are needed in its country to effectively counter the illicit trade and misuse of arms.

Further Recommendations to Prevent the Proliferation and Misuse of arms

Member States of SADC and the AU are also encouraged to consider the following additional recommendations:

A. Fully Implement Relevant International and Regional Frameworks

Universalization and Implementation of International Binding Instruments: SADC and AU Member States should be encouraged to sign, ratify and implement regional, continental and international binding instruments on illicit weapons, as mentioned above in this report. To date, five SADC Member States have yet to ratify the UN Firearms Protocol and should ratify it without delay to help achieve what is set out in the Lusaka Master Road Map on Silencing the Guns. Moreover, the eight Member States of SADC and other African states that have not yet ratified the ATT are urged to do so as soon as possible. If a state needs international assistance for this purpose, they should discuss this with the ATT Secretariat and seek support by developing a project under the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund. Other support can be sought from the UN regional disarmament office and from other international bodies such as the UN Institute for Disarmament Research.

Strengthen the SADC Protocol and Other Sub-Regional Agreements: The SADC Protocol was the first to be developed in Africa and since then other African sub-regional agreements, especially in the Kinshasa group and in ECOWAS, have included more enhanced provisions on the transfer, management and use of small arms and light weapons. There is no room for complacency. For example, none of the agreements currently address the UN Women, Peace and Security Agenda or issues related to some of the new weapons technologies. Since the SADC Protocol is under review, it is important to include new clauses that reflect SCR 1325 and resolution 2493, which was adopted by the Security Council under the leadership of South Africa in 2019 and urges States to recommit themselves to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

Align regional and global level action: SADC and AU Member States should consider, aligning their regional and sub-regional meetings on small arms and light weapons with the global cycle of meetings on the UNPoA, thus ensuring more effective coordination, synergy, and follow-up between what Member States aim for at the sub-regional, regional and global levels.

Peace Keeping Missions: SADC States participating in Peace Keeping Missions are urged to develop ammunition and weapons management policies and systems consistent with international best practice (e.g. as set out in the MOSAIC modules on small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, and also the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) and the UN SaferGuard Programme, which are guidelines developed by experts under the auspices of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs and other UN agencies concerned with the problems of SALW) to minimize diversion, proliferation and misuse. SADC and AU members are encouraged to take measures to secure stockpiles in emergency and conflict situations.

Implement global standards regarding the uses of force: SADC and AU Member States should have in place robust systems of training, monitoring and accountability to ensure compliance with IHL by their armed forces in conflict situations, and consistent with the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms for Law Enforcement Officials (1990) during policing operations. In the development of such systems governing the use of force, full use should be made of support offered by UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and independent external monitoring bodies. Implementing international standards regarding the legitimate use of weaponry provides States with the means to reduce civilian demand for weapons and to respond effectively to allegations of human rights and IHL violations by adopting the correct remedial measures. SADC and the AU should develop a funded program that will assist its Member States to conduct training and a culture of accountability among law enforcement agencies.

B. Strengthen National Arms Control and Disarmament Regulations and Practices

Improve the Regulation of Ports and Borders: The number of access points and transport methods requires that States develop systems for ongoing risk assessments of trafficking and sophisticated countermeasures to the illicit arms trade. The spread of weapons and ammunition across borders indicates smuggling routes spanning traffickers in several countries and shows the failure of weapons control processes in the transit countries. Efforts by law enforcement agencies to win the trust and cooperation of communities living in border areas need to be sustained to enhance intelligence and investigations.

Regulate Arms Brokering: Unregulated and illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons is a serious problem that the international community should address urgently. Arms brokering networks operate without regulation and detection in too many countries. Many African States and some SADC countries still lack the legislative framework to adequately prevent the illicit brokering demonstrated repeatedly by UN reports on arms embargo violations. SADC countries are urged to consider further legal and other steps to strictly control arms brokering by their nationals and by any person in their territory, and to enhance international cooperation with African and other States in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit arms brokering.[86]

Dismantle the nexus between corruption, illicit financing and purchase of weapons: All Member States in the SADC should encourage cooperation to expose traffickers in humans, drugs and arms. They should also prioritize efforts to combat terrorism and terrorist groups. States are urged to fully implement international obligations such as the Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and the Treaty Against Corruption, which most African States are party to, even if they have yet to ratify the treaty.

Strengthen Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) systems: More focus should be placed on improving PSSM systems in line with UN best practices by building the required capacities to address this challenge. At a minimum, States need to document what they are doing to combat the diversion of weapons and ammunition from stockpiles and to prevent unplanned explosions. More information is required on obsolete, unstable and redundant stockpiles across the continent. Arms management and destruction (AMD) needs to be improved in four main areas.[87] First, the capabilities for tracing serial numbers on weapons and packaging should be improved. Second, the relevant authorities should re-evaluate methods of destruction and decommissioning of surplus and dangerous stocks to ensure that all parts of disposed weapons are rendered beyond use and obsolete ammunition is safely destroyed. Third, storage facilities and personnel arrangements need to be improved to prevent theft, explosions, or other incidents relating to insecure infrastructure, poor management and corrupt practices. Fourth and finally, official bodies responsible for overseeing disarmament and surplus destruction processes need to be held more accountable by improving their record keeping, tracing, reporting and monitoring in order to heighten the effectiveness of disarmament efforts.

Improve Transparency and Reporting: In the decision-making process on military expenditures and reporting under the ATT and the UNPoA, more efforts should be made by SADC and AU Member States to ensure meaningful transparency so that

[86] Wood, Brian, and Danssaert, Peter. "Africa and the Grey Market" *The Journal of Good Governance in Africa*, 52 (2020).
[87] Dansaaert, Peter and Wood, Brian*, Surplus and Illegal Small Arms, Light Weapons and Their Ammunition: The Consequences of Failing to Dispose and Safely Destroy Them*, (Antwerp: IANSA and International Peace Information Service, 2017). https://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Gun-Destruction-Report-IANSA-2017.pdf

sufficient data is available to facilitate democratic scrutiny and accountability. This is relevant for building trust and confidence amongst States and the general public regarding security. It's also key to reducing and preventing corrupt practices and diversion, particularly in processes through which national governments decide to purchase and import weapons systems and production facilities into Africa, and to allow the transit and trans-shipment of arms through African countries.

Collect and Verify Information on Illicit Arms: SADC and AU Member States are encouraged to enhance their capacity to identify, seize and destroy illicit arms; be able to identify and cut the links between suppliers and recipients of illicit arms; and impose bans where necessary in line with the ATT. SADC and AU Member States should start to name and shame suppliers and recipients of illicit arms in public, including at summit levels.

Remove Military Weapons in Civilian Hands and in Populated Areas: Civilian holdings of small arms and their ammunition in countries with weak domestic regulation pose a significant risk of armed violence. The authorities in SADC and AU should support initiatives to prohibit and urgently remove military specification weapons from civilian possession, and to remove ammunition depots from populated urban and rural areas. Measures should also be taken to guide craft gunsmiths towards alternative livelihoods through vocational training. SADC Member States should be encouraged to prevent, detect and prosecute trafficking abuse of small arms and light weapons, and violent crimes by fully implementing the UN Basic Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.[88] Member States should create a comprehensive and effective process for firearm control, as well as ensure effective monitoring and enforcement of legislation.

Build Skills of Relevant Personnel: SADC and AU Member States should implement programs to build the capacity of national authorities and civil society organizations through skills training, utilization of relevant implementation tools and guides, and action-oriented research – including in response to the emphasis of the UNPoA Third Review Conference outcome in 2018 on the importance of sex and age disaggregated data. States and civil society organisations could, where appropriate, seek international assistance through project funding and technical cooperation from regional bodies and donor States. For example, UNGA resolution 73/69 on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects summarizing commitments agreed in the outcome document of the UNPoA Third Review Conference includes a proposal on the establishment of a dedicated fellowship training programme on SALW, in particular for developing countries. In addition, States and civil society can apply for funding of joint projects to the UNSCAR and the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund.

[88] United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), *Advocacy by Non-governmental Organizations to Strengthen the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, (New York, UNODA, 2018). https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/civil-society-20181.pdf

Address Threats and Opportunities from New Technologies: Countries in the AU and SADC region should try to coordinate a meeting with member states on threats posed by new weapon technologies and opportunities to use new technologies to improve arms control and disarmament. States could make use of the seventh Biennial Meeting of States in June of 2020 that will complete their considerations on the International Tracing Instrument supplementary annex.

Prevent unauthorized re-exports: Many SADC States are not major small arms producers nor exporters. In some cases, they have re-exported small arms and ammunition that they previously imported from another state. Some states would import re-exported small arms almost immediately after receiving the shipment or re-export of small arms and ammunition that have been in the national stockpile of the re-exporting state for several years, or even decades. SADC member states should consider establishing an investigative unit in the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation to monitor re-exports in the region.

C. Linking Strategic Agendas to Reduce the Demand for Weapons

Gender equality in disarmament: Enhancing research, public policies and communications with key stakeholders to promote effective measures to maximize the participation of women in arms control and disarmament efforts and to prevent the transfer, possession, and use of arms for gender-based violence should be a strategic aim of all SADC and African governments and civil society. SDG 5 on achieving gender equality and empowerment of women and girls should be a major priority, essential to the building of strategies to lessen demand and misuse of arms. The promotion of greater gender equality in disarmament and arms control activities is imperative in order to counter dominant masculine cultures promoting the proliferation and misuse of weapons, and to enhance public commitments to peace, security and socio-economic development. SADC should contribute meaningfully to this process. It is critical for further research and analysis on the proliferation and misuse of arms that gendered, disaggregated data is collected and made available by governments with a view to developing measures that incorporate gender perspectives and mainstream the participation of women in arms control and non-proliferation policies and initiatives.

Gender outreach and advocacy: All role players in government bodies and civil society organizations should continue to advocate for the incorporation of gender perspectives in disarmament discussions. Also, in its interactions with the disarmament community, SADC and AU Member States should demonstrate the utility of this approach and maximize opportunities to explore disarmament and gender equality inter-linkages. All sub-regions in Africa have the potential to play a leadership role in advocating for the inclusion of gender perspectives in disarmament and arms control dialogues and in decision-making. Some of the activities could be promoted during the UN General Assembly's First Committee. Furthermore, the

promotion of gender-sensitive disarmament and arms control initiatives should form part of the implementation of the AU Lusaka Master Roadmap. States should include more women as staff members in their agencies dealing with SALW issues and increase participation by women at various levels, including in the composition of delegations to international meetings and negotiations, such as during AU Peace and Security Council meetings. Ministers and senior-level male and female staff should incorporate gender considerations into remarks and interventions.

Linking to National Development Agendas: SADC governments and their agencies, together with implementing partners, should ensure the integration of arms control efforts into national development agendas in line with the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDG) especially SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions and its Target 16.4 to significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows by 2030, and SDG 5 on achieving gender equality and empowerment. SADC Member States should be encouraged to set targets related to actions set out in national action plans on small arms and light weapons, and these targets should be measurable. National targets could also be aligned with the goals and targets agreed in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and with the Outcome Document of the 2018 Review Conference on the UNPoA. Targets could also be aligned with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and national action plans on women, peace and security as well as on youth, peace and security, where they already exist.

Strengthen civil society - government partnerships: Partnership projects should be strengthened where appropriate and new projects initiated between local authorities, police, and civil society groups for the purpose of promoting community safety and violence reduction, and to reduce demand for weapons especially amongst youth.[89] These projects could include the creation of total gun-free zones for anyone except law enforcement around schools, hospitals, places of worship, markets, government offices, and sports and public recreational spaces, amongst others. SADC countries should institutionalise the Livingstone Formula by harnessing the contributions of civil society organisations towards the development of the annual programme of work of the SADC Troika.[90] Such a meeting could be organised on the margins of the annual Head of States SADC Summit. At the national level, SADC Member States should be encouraged to support public awareness and educational programmes to promote a culture of peace and develop skills at community and national levels for the non-violent resolution of disputes – including through

[89] Ibid.
A similar recommendation can be found in the 2018 edition of UNODA on Civil Society and Disarmament written by IANSA.

[90] The Livingstone Formula is an African Union protocol initiated in 2008 and operationalised in Livingstone, Zambia, during November 2016 to involve civil society organizations from the five regions of Africa to deliberate and prepare recommendations in a three year plan for discussion at the Forum of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Council had decided in December 2008 that " Civil Society Organisations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC."

adequate resourcing. They should also promote community services and specialist courts. SADC and its Member States could increase their effectiveness by including representatives of a wide range of independent NGOs as full partners in the work to eradicate the illicit trade in SALW and to reduce the human costs of armed violence. States should establish partnerships with private sector, and civil society to work together towards disarmament for development through Humanium Metal.[91]

Survivors of gun violence: SADC Member States should develop programs to assist victims of gun violence. States should improve their attention given to survivors of armed violence. They should also concentrate on developing measures to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 11, which aims to make cities and human settlements safe by 2030. Survivors of gun and other armed violence who choose to speak out against the proliferation and misuse of arms should be given platforms in media and at meetings to recount their experiences and help generate public support for government programmes to prevent and reduce armed violence.[92]

Assess and plan for climate-related security risks

Given the complexity of both climate change and its impacts on societies, it is crucial to assess important climate-related security risks vis-à-vis arms control and disarmament. The climate crisis should be understood not only as an exogenous natural force exemplified by extreme weather events but as a force generated by human activities that will severely impact social, political and economic relationships. Generating public policies should involve assessing the risk of conflict, the many risks posed to the prospects of peace and development, and the risks that stem from climate-insensitive developments initiatives. Failure to adequately respond to both immediate and longer-term climate threats will open the doors to violent responses, prevent the achievements of the sustainable development goals and threaten progress in reducing illicit demand for weapons and controlling the supply.

[91] Humanium Metal by IM Sweden is a new material made of recycled metal from gun destruction programs. The metal is melted and moulded into units, which are then made available for commercial production. The metal is produced under the control of relevant public authorities and have been destroyed in accordance with national legislation. IM supplies Humanium Metal to brands, designers and artists world wide. for brand collaborations such as the manufacture of unique watches. The funds raised from sales of the metal and products are channeled into urgently needed projects to empower people living in conflict-torn societies. See http://humanium-metal.com/

[92] A similar recommendation can be found in the 2018 edition of UNODA on Civil Society and Disarmament written by IANSA. See: https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/civilsociety/civil-society-and-disarmament-2018/

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About IM Swedish Development Partner

IM Swedish Development Partner (IM) is a rights-based civil society organization that is working towards strong democracies and full equality. In contribution to Sustainable Development Goal 16, IM has launched Humanium Metal. Humanium Metal is a multi-stakeholder partnership that connects governments, research institutions, the private sector as well as civil society into a joined fight for peaceful societies by creating a win-win solution for all involved actors. Metal from governmental weapon destruction programs in regions affected by armed violence is converted into a valuable commodity for peace and sold to vetted private companies. The income generated by sales and royalties is channeled back into civil society interventions empowering survivors of armed violence and community-based violence prevention programs.

About IANSA

The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) is the global movement against gun violence composed of hundreds of member organizations from across the world. The network was founded in 1997 and includes an array of stakeholders from non-governmental organisations, academia, think tanks, activist groups, and faith-based organisations, as well as survivors of gun violence. IANSA works by sharing knowledge through its offices in Accra and New York and amongst the network about the best practices, building coalitions for fact-based advocacy, and amplifying the voices of the individuals, families, and communities directly affected by violence and crime committed with small arms and light weapons. IANSA promotes measures to help reduce and eradicate gun violence and raises awareness among policymakers and the public about the global threat to human rights, sustainable development, and human security caused by the uncontrolled spread and misuse of small arms and light weapons. The network facilitates civil society participation in global and regional inter-governmental processes on small arms and light weapons. IANSA is the official coordinator of civil society participation in the regular meetings of governments to strengthen implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons.